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EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT




The widely held view that our system of public education performs poorly has
motivated a broad range of proposals for reform. Some policies, like the recent “No
Child Left Behind” Act, seek to improve student outcomes by introducing accountabil-
ity and changing the incentives within current administrative structures. Other pro-
posals (for example, vouchers and charter schools) stress the possibility of improving
student performance by exposing current administrative structures to competitive
pressures. A behavioral assumption that often motivates both kinds of proposals is
that many school districts are characterized by some form of bureaucratic malfea-
sance. Though this controversial assumption is widely held, there is little direct and
unambiguous evidence that it is accurate. For instance, one of the most widely voiced
criticisms of public schools is that they misallocate resources by directing too few “to
the classroom.”1  Criticisms like this focus on how districts allocate available resources
across different functions. However, most of the controversial empirical research on
school quality examines the effects of additional resources without much attention to
how those resources are spent [for example, Burtless, 1996]. The present study is
motivated by the notion that modeling within-district decisions regarding the alloca-
tion of expenditures might generate more robust and convincing insight into the rela-
tionship between school expenditures and student achievement.
More specifically, this research explores the widely held assumption that school
districts allocate too few of available resources to student instruction. This view of
school district behavior closely parallels Williamson’s [1963] “expense preference” model
of managerial discretion in regulated firms. The managers of school districts are typi-
cally thought to exhibit a relative preference for non-instructional resources that reflects
their self-interest or a persistent ignorance about the efficacy of such resources in
promoting student achievement. In this study, I present evidence on whether school
districts are characterized by expense preference. The first test parallels the empiri-
cal literature on expense preference in regulated firms and consists of evaluating the
responsiveness of the allocation of school resources to the presence of competition. If
expense preference exists, competition should limit the ability of school district man-
agers to spend outside the classroom. However, because the composition of spending24 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
in public schools may also affect the demand for private schools, ordinary least-squares
(OLS) estimates may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, both OLS and two-stage
least-squares (2SLS) estimates of the effect of competition on the allocation of public
school resources are presented. These estimates, which are based on the 10,188 uni-
fied school districts in 47 states, indicate that increased competition does lead some
school districts to allocate more of their available funds to student instruction.
I then discuss the extensive literature on educational production functions and its
controversial interpretation that there is no relationship between school expendi-
tures and student achievement. This body of research is widely interpreted to imply
that public schools exhibit production inefficiency and that additional outlays will not
increase student achievement. However, the existence of expense preference sug-
gests that this traditional educational production function is misspecified. This
misspecification is characterized not just by the frequent omission or aggregation of
non-instructional resources but also by the simultaneous determination of the alloca-
tion of resources and the level of student achievement. I present estimates of educa-
tional production functions that suggest that both of these specification issues are
important. These evaluations are based on a unique data set that contains, for the
unified school districts in 18 states, a consistently defined high school graduation rate
as well as a variety of data on the characteristics of the students, parents, districts,
and communities.
Conventional OLS specifications based on these data suggest that resource levels
have little or no effect on the level of student achievement in these districts. How-
ever, 2SLS estimates indicate that the level of instructional spending is a highly effec-
tive determinant of student achievement when conditioned on the decision to spend
on less effective functions outside the classroom. These results have important policy
implications. In particular, they suggest that both sides of the “Does money matter?”
debate may, in an important sense, be correct. On the one hand, school districts
appear to be inefficient. This production inefficiency seems consistent with the hy-
pothesis of expense preference. However, an econometric approach that recognizes
the joint dependence of the allocation of resources and the level of student achieve-
ment also contradicts some of the previous literature and finds that additional instruc-
tional spending can generate improvements in the level of student achievement in
public schools. These results are consistent with the recent evidence from Tennessee’s
class-size experiment, which generated an isolated increase in instructional resources
that increased student achievement [Krueger, 1999].
THE EXISTENCE OF EXPENSE PREFERENCE
The dramatic, long-term growth in the amount of real per-pupil resources devoted
to public elementary and secondary education is an increasingly well-known stylized
fact. Hanushek [1996] notes that, from 1890 to 1990, real expenditures per pupil rose
at a fairly stable annual rate of around 3.5 percent.2 By contrast, the decline in the
share of available resources spent directly on instruction is less well documented. The
historical data on staffing in public elementary and secondary schools indicate that,
during the 1949-50 school year, there were roughly 2.4 teachers for every non-teaching
employee. By the fall of 1993, there were fewer than 1.1 teachers for every non-teaching25 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
employee [U.S. Department of Education, 1995]. Unfortunately, the inconsistent and ag-
gregated historical data on resource allocations make it difficult to characterize these
intriguing changes fully.3 Nonetheless, the trend towards increased spending “outside
the classroom” is consistent with conventional criticisms of public schools. Since this
trend could also represent a rational institutional response to some deteriorating
socioeconomic priors or the changing goals of public schools, however, it could be
misleading. This section presents less ambiguous evidence on whether the allocation
of available resources in public schools is consistent with the hypothesis of expense
preference.
Competition and Expense Preference
The specification of a utility function for firm managers that includes personal
goals as well the profit motive has been a provocative development in the theory of
the firm [Alchian and Kessel, 1962; Becker, 1957; Baumol, 1967]. The theory of expense
preference [Williamson, 1963] is a version of these models that has received some
attention, particularly in the context of regulated industries. Williamson [1963] devel-
oped a model in which firm managers receive utility from profits and from “staff expense,
managerial emoluments and funds available for discretionary use.” A central implica-
tion of this model is that firms with managerial discretion will choose levels of these
preferred expenditures in excess of their profit-maximizing levels. Edwards [1977]
noted that an additional implication of this theory is that a firm with discretionary
management that faces little competition will have a greater opportunity to indulge in
preferred expenditures than similar firms in more competitive markets. Based on this
observation, Edwards [1977] tests the expense preference hypothesis for the banking
industry by estimating the responsiveness of the preferred expenditures to an index of
the firm’s monopoly power. The expense preference hypothesis is supported since the
preferred expenditures increase with monopoly power.
A similar test of the expense preference hypothesis would appear to be appropri-
ate for school districts. As public agencies, school districts are regulated entities that
may have considerable scope for managerial discretion. Furthermore, some school
districts may face little or weak competition. The hypothesis of expense preference
can be tested by estimating how the level of competition in state s and county c, Psc,
affects Ssci, the non-instructional expenditure share for district i. More specifically,
the equation of interest is:
(1) Ssci = WsciΠ + Pscγ + µs + εsci ,
where Wsci is a vector of student, parent, and community characteristics likely to
affect how school districts allocate resources, µs is a state-specific effect, and εsci is a
mean-zero random error. The measure of the competition faced by each school dis-
trict, Psc, has been defined as the proportion of all students within district i’s state and
county that are enrolled in private schools.4 The hypothesis of expense preference is
supported if an increase in competition reduces the share of resources spent “outside
the classroom.”
There is a countervailing reason that increases in Psc are likely to increase the
non-instructional share, Ssci. This is because many non-instructional costs, particularly26 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
those associated with administration, are relatively fixed. As more students attend pri-
vate schools, there is less opportunity for districts to recoup the fixed costs associated with
running a school district. Educational authorities in Texas recognized that “expenditure
patterns vary with enrollment differences” [Lewis, 1994]. The 1993 Texas statute that
limits administrative expenditures allows the smallest districts to spend as much as
36 percent of what is spent on instruction on administration whereas the largest dis-
tricts can only spend on administration 11 percent of what is spent on instruction. This
issue raises the possibility that the effect of competition on resource allocation is
nonlinear. This possibility is addressed by including a quadratic term for Psc in esti-
mates of Equation (1).
Another important specification issue is that the popularity of private schools may
not be independent of the spending decisions made by neighboring public schools [Hoxby,
1994]. For example, if parents do not value higher shares of non-instructional spend-
ing, some may decide that private schools are more attractive. This simultaneous
determination would bias OLS estimates of Equation (1) against the hypothesis of
expense preference. Because of this potential simultaneity, 2SLS estimates of γ are
also presented. The identification strategy for the 2SLS models exploits the variation
in Psc generated by variation in the county-specific population concentration of Catho-
lics. More specifically, the first-stage equation is
(2) Psci = WsciΩ + Cscδ + µs + νsci ,
where Csc is a vector of instrumental variables based on the population share of Catho-
lics.5 The i subscript is included to indicate that school districts are the unit of obser-
vation in these regressions. The estimates of Equations (1) and (2) presented here are
based on data from the 10,188 unified school districts in 47 states.6 A final specification
concern is that, because the school districts are of varying sizes, the error terms in
Equations (1) and (2) might be heteroskedastic. Therefore, corrected standard errors
[White 1980, 1982] are reported.
Data
Much of the data employed in this study comes from the National Center for
Education Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD). The CCD is a “comprehen-
sive, annual, national statistical database of all public elementary schools and school
districts, which contains data that are comparable across states.” Data on instruc-
tional and non-instructional spending in each district have been drawn from the Cen-
sus Bureau’s 1991-92 Survey of Local Government Finances (F33), which is included
among the current CCD files and contains the most current and comprehensive detail
on the level and allocation of educational expenditures. The NCES divides nearly all
current operating expenditures broadly between instruction and support services
[Fowler, 1990]. Instructional spending refers to all activities “dealing directly with the
interaction between teachers and students.” Support services encompass current expen-
ditures for several different activities “designed to enhance instruction.” Non-instructional
expenditures have been defined as expenditures for support services, excluding those
funds spent on student transportation, plant operation, and maintenance.7 More specifically,27 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
the functional categories that do constitute non-instructional expenditures include the
administration of schools and districts, the supervision and development of instruction,
and a variety of support services for pupils. The construction of this variable is
intended to identify spending that, at the margin, could have but did not “reach the
classroom.” The amount of current spending on these non-instructional items is not
trivial. On average, the non-instructional expenditure share, Ssci, is 23.4 percent. This
measure exhibits considerable variation with a minimum of 9.1 percent, a maximum
of 68.8 percent, and a standard deviation of 4.4 percent. However, the determinants
and consequences of this variation in the allocation of expenditures have been ignored
by research that assumes that school districts are fully characterized by their level of
available resources.
The measure of competition from private schools, Psc, is based on enrollment data
from the 1991-92 CCD and from the NCES’ 1991-92 Private Schools Survey (PSS). The
1991-92 PSS is a universe survey comparable to the CCD for public schools. Data on
the proportion of a county’s population that is Catholic were constructed using popula-
tion data from the 1980 Decennial Census and data on the Catholics from the Associa-
tion of Statistics of American Religious Bodies (ASARB).8 The allocation of expendi-
tures and the success of private schools may also be influenced by socioeconomic
priors, Wsci.9 The CCD includes a broad range of appropriate covariates taken from the
1990 Decennial Census and defined by public school district boundaries. Included among
these variables are the median household income in households with children, the
reported race of children within a school district, and the educational attainment of
householders in a district. Two relatively unusual regressors that reflect the likeli-
hood of a child to do well in school are also included: the percent of children who do not
speak English well and the percent of school-age children who are defined as “at risk.”
An “at-risk” child lives with a mother who is not a high school graduate, who is divorced
or separated, and who is below the poverty line. Wsci also includes six dummy vari-
ables that reflect the degree of urbanicity in the school district. Table 1 contains
summary statistics for the key variables in Equations (1) and (2).
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics: Unified School Districts in 47 States
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Non-Instructional Expenditure Share 23.4% (4.4) 9.1% 68.8%
Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil $3,024 (1040) $810 $17,609
Non-Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil $935 (414) $210 $7,313
County Students in Private School 7.3% (7.4) 0% 58.8%
 Catholic in County 17.5% (16.3) 0% 100%
 Non-White Children 12.0% (17.5) 0% 100%
 Children At Risk 2.8% (3.5) 0% 38.4%
 Children Who Speak English “Not Well” or “Not At All” 0.9% (2.0) 0% 80.0%
 Householders with High School Degree or Less 62.6% (14.5) 3.1% 100%
 Householders with Some College 22.2% (3.5) 0% 38.4%
Log of Median Income in Households with Children 10.4 (0.3) 8.5 11.828 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 2
OLS and 2SLS Estimates: Non-Instructional Expenditure Share Equation
Model (1) Model (2)
Variables OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
% County Students in Private School .014 –.008 .040 .162
(2.42) (0.45) (3.10) (2.08)
% County Students in Private School Squared — — –.092 –.660
(2.40) (2.05)
% Nonwhite Children .034 .034 .033 .033
(9.22) (9.11) (9.09)  (8.78)
% Children At-Risk –.002 –.002 –.004 –.010
(0.13) (0.10) (0.21) (0.52)
% Children Who Speak English “Not Well” or “Not At All” –.001 –.0004 –.002 –.004
(0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.18)
% Householders with High School Degree or Less –.048 –.048 –.049 –.052
(9.14) (9.14) (9.22) (9.19)
% Householders with Some College –.051 –.051 –.053 –.066
(5.28) (5.30) (5.43) (5.38)
Log of Median Income in Households with Children –.002 –.002 –.003 –.004
(0.77) (0.59) (1.00) (1.35)
R2 .361 .361 .361 .356
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions — 5.76 — 1.35
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent [White, 1980, 1982] absolute values of t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Regressors included but not reported are an intercept, state dummy variables, and six
dummy variables for the degree of urbanicity. The statistic for the test of overidentifying restrictions is
distributed as a chi-squared [Newey, 1985]. The 95 percent critical value is 7.82 for the first 2SLS
regression, which has 3 degrees of overidentification. For the last 2SLS regression, which has 2
degrees of overidentification, the critical value is 5.99. In both models, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the model is correctly specified.
Identification Strategy
In order for 2SLS estimation to generate consistent estimates of the effect of
private school competition on the allocation of resources, the instrumental variables
must be exogenous determinants of the presence of private schools that are rightfully
omitted from Equation (1). The population share of Catholics is likely to satisfy both
criteria [Evans and Schwab, 1995; Hoxby, 1994]. Conditional on other socioeconomic
covariates, the population share of Catholics is driven by historical events and should
be uncorrelated with how public schools currently spend available funds. Further-
more, the concentration of Catholics should be a strong determinant of the demand
for private schooling. In the 1993-94 school year, roughly 51 percent of private school
enrollment was in Catholic schools [U.S. Department of Education, 1995]. A high
proportion of Catholics also implies increased availability of private schooling. In densely
Catholic areas, the costs of establishing private schools are reduced through several
mechanisms [Hoxby, 1994]. Church fund-raising reduces the cost of tuition in Catholic
schools. Scale effects can also reduce the costs of Catholic schools through savings on
transportation, various fixed costs, and the availability of religious and volunteer staff.
Instrumental variables for the level of competition from private schools were
formed by ranking school districts, in descending order, by the proportion of the county
population that is Catholic. The instrumental variables are the four dummy variables
associated with each quintile.10 First-stage estimates of Equation (2), which are not29 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
reported here, indicate that the population concentration of Catholics has a large and
statistically significant effect on the popularity of private schools. For example, Psc in
counties with the lowest concentration of Catholics is over 9 percentage points lower
than in counties with a high proportion of Catholics. Each of the four instrumental
variables is a statistically significant determinant of Psc; no t-statistic has an absolute
value of less than 16. Furthermore, these precisely measured effects are plausibly
monotonic. Lower concentrations of Catholics imply significantly less competition from
private schools.
Results
The results of estimating Equation (1) by OLS and 2SLS are reported in Table 2.
The effects of socioeconomic characteristics on the allocation of school resources are
mixed. Conditional on state and urbanicity dummies, neither the level of income, the
proportion of children at-risk, nor the proportion of children not speaking English well
has a statistically significant effect on the non-instructional expenditure share, Ssci.
School districts with the most highly educated parents, however, spend significantly
more of available resources on non-instructional support. Increases in the proportion
of nonwhite children also imply that the non-instructional share is higher.11
The instrumental variables, Csc, perform well in the second stage. The test of
overidentifying restrictions [Newey, 1985] cannot reject the null hypothesis, which
states the model is correctly specified. Comparison of the OLS and 2SLS estimates of
Models (1) and (2) implies that OLS underestimates the effect of competition in reduc-
ing the non-instructional expenditure share. The direction of this bias in Model (1)
suggests that a high non-instructional expenditure share in public schools increases
the attractiveness of private schools. A comparison of Models (1) and (2) also implies
that the effect of private schools on the allocation of resources in public schools is
highly nonlinear. When competition is low, increases in the proportion of students
attending private schools raises the share of resources spent outside the classroom.
This is consistent with the fact that non-instructional costs are relatively fixed and
that low levels of competition may be less likely to curtail managerial discretion.
However, once the share of county students attending private schools exceeds roughly
12 percent, increased competition implies that school districts spend more of available
resources on instruction. This statistically significant effect is consistent with the
hypothesis of expense preference. Over 20 percent of unified districts face such high
levels of competition from private schools. Furthermore, these districts are respon-
sible for educating nearly 34 percent of public school students. This responsiveness of
resource allocations to competition suggests that some school districts are character-
ized by expense preference. Furthermore, these results imply that a misallocation of
resources can be an equilibrium outcome in the absence of strong competition.
THE ENIGMA OF SCHOOL QUALITY AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES
Concern over the performance of public schools has motivated an extensive litera-
ture that has attempted to identify the structural effect of school resources on school
quality. One widely held but still controversial interpretation of this literature is that30 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
there is “no strong or systematic relationship between school expenditures and stu-
dent performance” [Hanushek, 1986, 1162]. The evidence used to buttress this conclu-
sion has been based upon estimates of educational production functions:
(3) Q = F(I, W) .
The observed “output” in such evaluations, Q, is often performance on a standardized
test. The “inputs” usually include a measure of the level of school resources, I, and
those attributes of students, their families, and communities likely to affect achieve-
ment, W. The measure of school resources is generally per-pupil expenditures or
some determinant of instructional expenditures like pupil-teacher ratios, teachers’
salaries, teachers’ education, or teachers’ experience.
Typically, those measures of school resources are poor predictors of student achieve-
ment when conditioned on W. However, the stylized conclusion that traditional mea-
sures of school resources have no systematic relationship to school quality has not
gone unchallenged. Several recent studies that use district-level data similar to that
employed here report a partial correlation between resource levels and student achieve-
ment [Ferguson, 1991; Sander, 1993; Ferguson and Ladd, 1996]. Convincing evidence
also suggests that targeted class-size reductions raise student achievement [Krueger
1999]. Similarly, a meta-analytic review of the literature on educational production
functions concludes that there is a policy-relevant link between resource levels and
student achievement [Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald, 1994]. One of the most widely
discussed criticisms of traditional education production functions, however, has come
from studies that define student achievement by labor market success rather than by
test scores. Card and Krueger [1992] argue that test scores may be a poor proxy for
student outcomes of interest like subsequent earnings. Furthermore, they demon-
strate that state-level measures of school quality like pupil-teacher ratios and average
teacher salaries appeared to have a substantive impact on the earnings of white males
born between 1920 and 1949. Subsequent researchers have raised questions about the
earnings/school resources link, however, and the traditional “Does Money Matter?”
question is not a settled one [Burtless, 1996].
The ongoing controversy over the effect of resource levels on school quality has
largely ignored how the allocation of resources to particular functions relates to achieve-
ment. Adherents of the position that “money does not matter” argue that schools
must be inefficient since they “pay for attributes that are not systematically related to
achievement.” Proponents of this view, however, have not identified the nature of this
inefficiency and argue that, in the presence of such uncertainty, the appropriate policy
response is a system of output-based incentives for schools. For example, Hanushek
[1991] recommends that “one might simply give up on the idea of being able to identify
the relevant inputs and to design policies that directly altered these inputs. Instead
policies could be developed that keyed on performance, regardless of how that was
produced.” A better understanding of whether and how school districts are inefficient,
though, could motivate a first-best reform of public education. Unfortunately, the
traditional specification of educational production functions is ill-suited to identify the
existence and nature of this inefficiency since it typically assumes that school districts
are completely characterized by a single exogenous input. Many current reform pro-
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school districts. An econometric approach that investigates these assumptions by
modeling within-district behavior may offer more convincing and empirically robust
policy guidance than the traditional specifications.
Bureaucracy and Achievement
Though many proposals focus on decision making within districts, there is remark-
ably little evidence on how these decisions affect school quality. In particular, there is
little empirical evidence to support the widely held assumption of bureaucratic mal-
feasance and the quantitative evidence that does exist has several troubling features.
The most widely known evidence on the relationship between school quality and bureau-
cracy comes from Chubb and Moe’s [1990] controversial book. They demonstrated
that an index of “good” school organization relates positively to test scores and that
indices of administrative strength relate negatively to their index of good school orga-
nization. Several important concerns have been raised about this evidence.12 Little
attention has been paid, however, to a fundamental ambiguity of the partial correla-
tions identified by Chubb and Moe [1990]. They took their results to mean that admin-
istrative strength lowers student performance; however, the partial correlations they
identify are also consistent with the reasonable hypothesis that schools respond to
poor student performance by increasing their administrative support. Chubb and Moe
[1990], recognizing this ambiguity, discuss some conflicting evidence on the respon-
siveness of bureaucracy to performance and argue that the bias in their OLS esti-
mates is not severe. They concede, however, that “the test is not definitive, for it is
impossible to tell through individual equations what a system of simultaneous equa-
tions might reveal.”
Other evidence on the relationship between bureaucratic behavior and school
quality has been based on evaluating the effects of allocated resources. Anderson,
Shughart and Tollison [1991] examine the variation in 48 observations of state-level
test scores for public and private school students and high school completion rates
among public school students. They find that the size of educational bureaucracies in
terms of employment per pupil correlates negatively with educational achievement.13
Based on these results, they conclude that there exists a “bureaucratic substitution
effect” through which the size of educational bureaucracy causes poor student perfor-
mance. There are several reasons to question whether these results will prove to be
robust. Some of the more obvious criticisms of these models concern the limited observa-
tions and the failure to condition their results upon the broad set of socioeconomic and
community characteristics traditionally employed in this literature. More troubling is
that the socioeconomic covariates that are included [that is, state per-capita income
and the ratio of urban to rural population] are poor predictors of their achievement
measures. This directly contradicts perhaps the only point upon which there has been
substantial agreement in the literature modeling student achievement. A more funda-
mental problem with this result, however, is that, because the composition of resources
may be determined endogenously, the partial correlations identified by such OLS
estimates could be misleading.14 For instance, it may be that school district managers
increase non-instructional support in response to poor student performance. This response
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resources on achievement. Brewer [1996] finds that the relationship between admin-
istrative spending and student achievement is sensitive to such model specifications.15
Expense Preference in School Districts
The model of bureaucratic behavior implicit in many reform proposals is that
school districts, motivated by either self-interest or persistent ignorance, choose an
inefficient mix of inputs.16 A testable implication of this controversial hypothesis can
be identified by specifying an educational production function that includes per-pupil
non-instructional inputs, N:
(4) Q = F(N, I, W) .
Under the hypothesis of expense preference, the managers of school districts receive
utility not just from the level of achievement, Q, but also from the levels of resources,
N and I:
(5) U = U(N, I, Q) .
The hypothesized preference for non-instructional resources implies that UN > UI. In
deciding how to allocate expenditures, the level of available resources is considered to
be exogenous:
(6) E(Z) = N + I .
The variable Z represents variables that are exogenous determinants of the amount
of resources available to a district. Maximizing Equation (5) over N subject to Equa-
tions (4) and (6) yields the following first-order condition:
(7) UN – UI = –UQ(FN – FI) .
The main implication of the preference for non-instructional inputs (UN > UI) is that
too few resources are spent on instruction. Assuming diminishing returns in the pro-
duction function, the use of too few instructional resources implies a testable hypoth-
esis: marginal products such that FN < FI. In other words, school districts that exhibit
expense preference will not equate the marginal product of instructional and non-
instructional inputs as a social planner would. An important but less obvious implica-
tion of this model is that the equilibrium levels of N, I, and Q are all determined
simultaneously.
In the next section, the key prediction of this model is tested by generating OLS
and 2SLS estimates of the educational production functions in Equations (3) and (4).
More specifically, the empirical strategy employed is to use Z to identify the struc-
tural effects of N and I on the level of student achievement. Little can be said, a priori,
about the direction of bias in OLS estimates of the educational production functions in
Equations (3) and (4). However, the conventional finding that “money doesn’t matter”
in estimates of Equation (3) could be consistent with the existence of expense prefer-
ence. Estimates of the effect of instructional resources would be biased downward if
they have a positive covariance with omitted and less effective non-instructional spending.33 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
In other words, studies that find no effect of per-pupil expenditures on achievement
may have confounded the very different effects of resources spent inside and outside
the classroom. OLS estimates of Equation (4) could also lead to biased inferences in
the presence of expense preference. For example, it is plausible that OLS estimates of
Equation (4) would underestimate the effectiveness of instructional resources as well as
overestimate the effect of non-instructional resources. This would occur if managers
have increased scope for discretionary spending outside the classroom in districts
where students are performing well. The results reported in the next section suggest
that both of these potential biases are important.
SCHOOL RESOURCES AND HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETION
This section presents a unique data set that is used to generate OLS and 2SLS
estimates of the educational production functions in Equations (3) and (4). A central
question is whether or not the model of expense preference can generate new insights
into the relationship between resources and student outcomes. The educational out-
come to be modeled is a district-level high school graduation rate based on data from
the CCD. In the first stage of the 2SLS models, reduced-form equations for the vari-
ables N and I are estimated. The construction of N and I was discussed earlier. The
first-stage equations for district i in state s take the following form:
(8) ln(Nsi) = WsiΩ + Zsiδ + µs + ξsi ,
(9) ln(Isi) = Wsi∆ + ZsiΤ + νs + ωsi .
As in the earlier evaluations, Wsi is a vector of variables reflecting the socioeconomic
priors of district i in state s. The variable Zsi represents a vector of instrumental
variables that are discussed in a subsequent section; µs and νs represent state fixed
effects. Log transforms of the independent variables in Equations (8) and (9) have been
employed only when there are non-zero observations for those variables.
The predicted values from Equations (8) and (9) have been used in second-stage
models of some educational production functions. The reported specification for the
educational production functions is log-linear.17 More specifically, the estimated pro-
duction function takes the following form:
(10) ln(Qsi) = αln(Nsi) + βln(Isi) + ZsiΠ + µs + εsi .
Given this functional form, estimates of α and β can be interpreted as the elasticities
of student achievement with respect to non-instructional and instructional expendi-
tures. The hypothesis of expense preference is supported if the marginal product of
instructional expenditures implied by β is greater than the marginal product of non-
instructional expenditures implied by α.18 OLS and 2SLS estimates of traditionally
specified educational production functions (that is, excluding N or combining N and I)
are also presented. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported for all
models [White, 1980,1982]. Summary statistics for all the key variables are reported
in Table 3.34 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics: Unified School Districts in 18 States
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Minimum Maximum
Graduation Rate 88.1% (9.4) 46.9% 100.0%
Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil $3,255 (1219) $1,492 $17,609
Non-instructional Expenditures Per Pupil $978 (425) $295 $5,801
Nonwhite Children 12.4% (17.2) 0% 100%
Children At-Risk 2.9% (3.7) 0% 29.9%
Children Who Speak English “Not Well” or “Not At All” 1.3% (2.4) 0% 34.1%
Householders with High School Degree or Less 61.5% (15.3) 7.5% 100%
Householders with Some College 22.4% (6.9) 0.0% 50.7%
Log of Median Income in Households with Children 10.5 (0.4) 8.9 11.8
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per Person on $12 (12) $0 $152
Parks and Recreation
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per Person on $61 (44) $5 $450
Streets and Highways
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per Person on $7 (5) $0 $59
Public Buildings
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per Person on $25 (16) $0 $291
General Control
Court-Mandated Education Finance Reform 0.21 (0.41) 0 1.00
High School Completion
One controversial feature of much of the prior literature relating resources and
achievement has been the use of test scores as a measure of student achievement.
What such tests actually measure and whether students take them seriously is of
general concern. More importantly, higher test scores appear to have only a modest
impact on economic outcomes like wages [Hanushek, Rivkin and Jamison, 1992]. In
contrast, the economic consequences of educational attainment are well-known. In
particular, it has been shown that high school completion is associated with signifi-
cantly higher wages and an increased likelihood of employment [Markey, 1988; Murphy
and Topel, 1987; Levy and Murnane, 1992]. The educational outcome modeled here is
a district-level high school completion rate. The 1993-94 CCD files contain dropout
data by school district and by grade for 18 states that report dropouts according to a
consistent definition. More specifically, according to this definition, a dropout is a
student who was enrolled at any time during a particular school year and was not
enrolled in October of the next school year and had not graduated or transferred and
was not absent due to temporary disciplinary action. The student outcome modeled in
this chapter is the district-level high school graduation rate implied by these dropout
data and the corresponding enrollment data. The final data set consists of the 4,159
unified school districts that are operational in the 18 states that use this definition.19
The graduation rate implied by these data does not track a single cohort but instead
reflects, not unlike a moving average, the rate of grade completion by four cohorts.
Given the number of dropouts from grade j of district i, Dij, and the fall enrollment in
that same grade and district, Eij, a grade completion rate can be formed as:
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Since each grade completion rate is conditional on having arrived at that grade, an
implied high school graduation rate for a district can be calculated as the product of








This graduation rate has a mean of 88.1 percent and ranges from 46.9 percent to 100
percent. Because this measure of educational attainment is defined by the schooling
decisions made by school-age teens, those who eventually go on to obtain high school
equivalencies are not identified as graduates. Some evidence suggests that this con-
struction is appropriate [Cameron and Heckman, 1993].
Identification Strategies
Because the allocation of expenditures and the level of student achievement may
be determined endogenously, identifying the effect of expenditures on student achieve-
ment requires instrumental variables that influenced expenditures but can be right-
fully omitted from a structural equation modeling student achievement. The models
presented here rely on two sets of instrumental variables. One set is based on court-
mandated education finance reform. Between 1971 and 1992, legal challenges to sys-
tems of education finance based on property taxes had been mounted in 42 states.20 In
12 of those states, the Supreme Court ruled that the system of education finance was
unconstitutional. Recent research has shown that these rulings had a dramatic effect
on the availability of educational resources within “reform” states [Evans, Murray,
and Schwab, 1997; Card and Payne, 2002; Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 1998]. For
example, Evans, Murray, and Schwab [1997, 12] concluded that “court-ordered educa-
tion finance reform did significantly decrease within-state inequality in spending”
through higher state taxes whose revenues were directed to a state’s poorest districts.
The court rulings on the constitutionality of the system of education finance pro-
vide a plausibly exogenous source of variation in school expenditures. Generally, even
in reform states, districts that spent little on education continue to spend little. Con-
ditional on having been a low-spending district, however, the interaction of being in a
reform state and having been a low-spending district is an exogenous determinant of
current expenditures. More specifically, a school district that had few resources before
court-mandated reform of the education finance system is likely to have more after-
ward. Furthermore, controlling for a district’s pre-reform within-state expenditure
ranking and state effects, this change in a district’s current spending is attributable to
the interpretation of state constitutions by state courts and should therefore be orthogo-
nal with the current level of student achievement in the district.
States experiencing court-mandated education finance reform are well represented
in this data set. Five of the 18 states in this data set (Arkansas, California, Kansas,
Kentucky, and Texas) have had their system of education finance declared unconstitu-
tional.21 The reform states contain 21 percent of the school districts in this data set.
Four instrumental variables have been constructed by interacting an indicator for
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ranking of a school district’s current expenditures for the 1976-77 school year.22 These
expenditures predate the first successful property tax revolt and the movement towards
equalizing school resources in the reform states. The expectation is that districts that
spent little before the impact of reform currently spend more. First-stage estimates of
Equations (8) and (9), which are reported in Table 4, confirm the impact of court-
mandated education finance reform on school spending. For example, a district that
spent the least within its state in the fall of 1976 and is located in a reform state now
spends 8.4 percent more on instruction and 11.4 percent more on non-instructional
support than a similar district in a state without reform (Models (1) and (4)). These
effects are statistically significant. Other things being equal, school districts in reform
states that spent little before the court-mandate (that is, those in the third, fourth,
and fifth quintiles) now have significantly higher expenditures.
TABLE 4
First-Stage Estimates: Log Expenditures Per Pupil Equation
Instructional Non-Instructional
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Court Mandate*Quintile 2 .0330 — .0375 .0041 — .0078
(1.60) (1.84) (0.14) (0.26)
Court Mandate*Quintile 3 .0831 — .0874 .0759 — .0795
(4.08) (4.35) (2.67) (2.82)
Court Mandate*Quintile 4 .0879 — .0899 .1052 — .1034
(4.33) (4.50) (3.78) (3.75)
Court Mandate*Quintile 5 .0835 — .0896 .1140 — .1151
(3.90) (4.27) (3.86) (3.91)
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per — .0010 .0009 — .0017 .0016
Person on Parks and Recreation (3.13) (2.94) (3.67) (3.44)
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per — .0003 .0003 — .0000 .0000
Person on Streets and Highways (3.42) (3.55) (0.09) (0.32)
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per — .0027 .0028 — .0043 .0044
Person on Public Buildings (3.65) (3.98) (3.96) (4.14)
1982 County-Level Expenditures Per — .0005 .0005 — .0008 .0008
Person on General Control (1.90) (1.94) (2.07) (2.04)
R2 .819 .822 .823 .695 .698 .700
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent [White, 1980] absolute values of  t-statistics are reported in paren-
theses. Regressors included in the first stage but not reported are an intercept, log of median family
income, percent of children nonwhite, percent householders with a high school degree or less, percent
householders with some college, percent of children at-risk, percent of children who speak English “not
well” or “not at all”, state dummy variables, six dummy variables for the degree of urbanicity, and four
dummy variables for within-state quintile ranking in 1976-77 current expenditures per pupil.
A second set of instrumental variables for school spending is based on the Tiebout
hypothesis. Charles Tiebout’s [1956] seminal article on local public goods outlines how
the mobility of citizens can yield an equilibrium in which the provision of local public
goods reflects the preferences of the population. In choosing where to live, a voter,
like the consumer of a private good, will reveal his preferences by selecting the tax
and expenditure combinations most to his liking given his budget constraint. This
self-sorting of citizens according to their preference pattern for public goods provides
another potentially valid set of instruments for educational spending. The determi-
nants of the demand for local public goods will include not only the level of wealth37 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
within a community but also the unique taste for such goods among its citizens.23 The
taste for local public goods that is independent of other demand determinants is, theo-
retically, a valid instrument: it should explain variation in expenditures for a local
public good like education but be omitted from a structural model of student achievement.
Public education is a classic Tiebout good in that it is an important determinant of
the location decision for many home buyers and renters. Other local public goods are
likely to matter as well, however. Tiebout [1956, 418] noted that “the availability and
quality of such facilities and services as beaches, parks, police protection, roads, and
parking facilities will enter into the decision-making process.” This study uses the
levels of spending on such non-educational public goods—conditional on other demand
determinants—as proxies for a community’s idiosyncratic taste for local public goods
and as instruments for the level of educational spending in a school district. Data for
non-educational per capita expenditures have been drawn from the county-area file of
the 1982 Census of Governments. The county-area file aggregates by function expen-
ditures by all governments within a county. These models employ four instrumental
variables: the 1982 current operating expenditures per person on parks and recre-
ation, streets and highways, general public buildings, and general control. The decade
lag in these non-educational expenditures is appropriate since the long-term Tiebout
characteristics of a community can still be identified, while the lag implies it is less
likely that these expenditures are generating services or capturing unobserved socio-
economic conditions that could affect more recent educational achievement. Given
that many studies are unable to demonstrate a partial correlation between contempo-
raneous educational expenditures and achievement, however, the reasonable concern
that these lagged non-educational expenditures could be correlated with student
achievement may be overdrawn.24 Table 4 reports how these instruments perform in
first-stage models. The coefficients on all four variables in each model are positive.
This is consistent with the theoretical motivation for these instruments since it shows
that communities that, ceteris paribus, spend more on non-educational local public
goods will also choose to spend more on education. Controlling for other demand
characteristics, the levels of non-educational local public goods are jointly significant
determinants of educational spending. Except for “Streets and Highways” expendi-
tures in the first-stage equation for non-instructional expenditures, each of these vari-
ables is individually significant as well.
Results
OLS and 2SLS estimates of traditional education production functions are reported
in Table 5. These specifications only address the impact of resource levels on student
achievement. Like prior research on student attainment, the results consistently indi-
cate that student, family, and community characteristics are strong predictors of edu-
cational achievement. Districts whose students come from wealthier families or have
more educated parents have higher graduation rates. For example, a 10 percent increase
in median income implies an increase in the graduation rate of roughly 0.3 percent.
Districts whose children are nonwhite, at-risk, or do not speak English well have
lower graduation rates. An increase of 10 percentage points in the proportion of chil-
dren at-risk implies the graduation rate falls by nearly 6 percent.2538 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 5
OLS and 2SLS Estimates: Log of High School Graduation Rate Equation
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of Instructional Expenditures .044 .107 –.036 — — —
Per Pupil (3.86) (1.48) (0.27)
Log of Non-Instructional and Instructional — — — .047 .085 –.059
Expenditures Per Pupil (4.23) (1.30) (0.48)
% Nonwhite Children –.077 –.081 –.071 –.075 –.082 –.068
(4.16) (4.19) (3.52) (4.24) (4.16) (3.14)
% Children At Risk –.573 –.562 –.587 –.577 –.571 –.587
(6.58) (6.38) (6.54) (6.61) (6.52) (6.63)
% Children Who Speak English “Not Well” –.490 –.484 –.497 –.493 –.492 –.495
or “Not At All” (4.43) (4.40) (4.44) (4.47) (4.48) (4.40)
% Householders with High School Degree –.106 –.089 –.128 –.103 –.090 –.138
or Less (5.21) (3.11) (3.04) (5.03) (3.05) (3.00)
% Householders with Some College –.199 –.155 –.255 –.194 –.166 –.274
(5.75) (2.53) (2.58) (5.57) (2.76) (2.77)
Log of Median Income in Households .030 .029 .030 .029 .029 .030
with Children (3.04) (2.98) (3.06) (3.03) (2.99) (3.06)
R2 .334 .332 .331 .334 .332 .331
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions — 4.16 8.73 — 4.99 8.73
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent [White, 1980, 1982] absolute values of  t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. All models include an intercept, state dummy variables, six dummy variables for the
degree of urbanicity, and four dummy variables for within-state quintile ranking in 1976-77 operating
expenditures per pupil. Models (2) and (5) are identified by the non-educational expenditures. Models
(3) and (6) are identified by court-mandated education finance reform. The statistic for the test of
overidentifying restrictions is distributed as a chi-squared [Newey, 1985]. The 95 percent critical value
is 7.82 for these 2SLS regressions, which have 3 degrees of overidentification.
The OLS estimates presented in Models (1) and (4) also suggest that resource
levels might have a statistically significant impact on the graduation rate. For example,
the elasticity of the graduation rate with respect to current per-pupil operating expen-
ditures (Model (4)) is 0.047. Other recent research using similar district-level data and
OLS models also report such partial correlations [Ferguson, 1991; Sander, 1993;
Ferguson and Ladd, 1996]. However, since these relationships are not robust to 2SLS
estimation (Models (2), (3), (5), and (6)), these partial correlations may only reflect the
presence of omitted variable bias. The 2SLS estimates of traditional production func-
tions are consistent with prior research that finds small and statistically insignificant
effects of resource levels on achievement.26 Furthermore, these results also support
recent research that argues that unobserved heterogeneity is an important specifica-
tion issue when modeling the effect of resources on student achievement with aggre-
gated data [Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor, 1996].
Table 6 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of an education production function
that disaggregates N and I. The OLS results for this production function (Model (1))
suggest that both instructional and non-instructional resources are somewhat effec-
tive in promoting student achievement. Furthermore, given these elasticities, the
average levels of both expenditure categories are roughly consistent with a “social
planner” view of school district behavior. More specifically, it is not clear, from OLS
estimates, that non-instructional resources are overutilized by school districts. The
model of expense preference presented in the previous section, however, suggests39 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
that the misspecification in traditional estimates of educational production functions
may stem not only from the exclusion or aggregation of some resources but also from
the simultaneous determination of the level of student achievement and the alloca-
tion of resources. The 2SLS estimates reported in Models (2), (3), and (4) suggest that
both specification issues are important. For example, the traditional production func-
tions in Table 5 that exclude or aggregate expenditures appear to confound the very
different effects of instructional and non-instructional resources. The simultaneous
determination of student achievement and resource allocation also appears impor-
tant. The OLS estimates of α and β in Model (1) underestimate the effect of instruc-
tional resources and overestimate the efficacy of non-instructional expenditures. The
biases in these OLS estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that school districts
with high student achievement also have increased managerial discretion to spend
outside the classroom.
TABLE 6
OLS and 2SLS Estimates: Log of High School Graduation Rate Equation
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil .030 .422 .626 .469
(2.12) (2.00) (1.37) (2.40)
Log of Non-Instructional Expenditures Per Pupil .016 –.261 –.508 –.327
(1.75) (1.78) (1.60) (2.36)
R2 .335 .277 .203 .259
Class of Instruments
1982 Non-Educational Government Expenditures x x
Court-Mandated Education Finance Reform x x
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions — 0.42 2.91 4.99
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent [White, 1980, 1982] absolute values of t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Regressors included in the first stage but not reported are an intercept, log of median
family income, percent of children nonwhite, percent householders with a high school degree or less,
percent householders with some college, percent of children at-risk, percent of children who speak
English “not well” or “not at all,” state dummy variables, six dummy variables for degree of urbanicity,
and four dummy variables for within-state quintile ranking in 1976-77 current expenditures per pupil.
The statistic for the test of overidentifying restrictions is distributed as a chi-squared [Newey, 1985].
The 95 percent critical value is 5.99 for the first two 2SLS regressions, which have 2 degrees of
overidentification. For the last 2SLS regression, which has 6 degrees of overidentification, the critical
value is 12.59. In all three models, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly
specified.
The 2SLS results suggest that the effects of instructional and non-instructional
expenditures on student achievement are not trivial. For example, the results from
Model (4), which includes both classes of instrumental variables, imply that the elas-
ticity of the graduation rate with respect to non-instructional expenditures is not just
small but significantly negative. An increase of 10 percent in per-pupil non-instructional
expenditures implies that the graduation rate falls by 3.3 percent. These negative
estimates are somewhat surprising. However, two points should be emphasized. First,
it is important to recall that these estimates are point elasticities that describe only
the marginal effect of such spending. Second and more importantly, these negative
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practices that are positively related to non-instructional spending and that harm stu-
dent achievement. For example, it may be that districts with high non-instructional
spending engage in other management practices (for example, curriculum, hiring)
that reduce school quality. To the extent that this interpretation is true, it suggests
that the research focus on the effects of resources presents a somewhat misleading
picture of the district behaviors that influence quality.
The results in Table 6 also suggest that, conditional on the effect of non-instructional
spending, instructional resources have a strong effect on high school completion. A 10
percent increase in per-pupil instructional expenditures raises the graduation rate 4.7
percent. The effects in Models (2) and (3) are of similar magnitudes but less precise.
While the 2SLS elasticities are large with respect to the OLS estimates, these results
do not appear to be a specious result of instrumental variables estimation. Two very
different classes of instruments generate this result and both classes of instruments
perform well in the first and second stages. For each of the 2SLS models in Table 6,
the test of overidentifying restrictions [Newey, 1985] cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the model is correctly specified. Like the results presented earlier, these esti-
mates lend support to the view that school districts exhibit an unproductive prefer-
ence for non-instructional resources. The 2SLS elasticities imply that non-instructional
resources are overutilized relative to instructional resources.27 However, unlike like
much of the literature that argues that public schools are inefficient, these results
also indicate that public school districts do use some resources effectively. Resources
spent by these districts on instruction appear to have a large and significant impact on
achievement when properly conditioned on a district’s allocative decision.
CONCLUSIONS
Although most educational reforms are motivated by concerns about district deci-
sion making, the traditional approach to educational production functions has assumed
that school districts are simply characterized by a single resource level. The research
presented here was motivated by the notion that modeling within-district decisions
might generate more robust and convincing insight into the controversial relation-
ship between school expenditures and school quality. More specifically, this research
has explored the view that some school districts exhibit a relative preference for non-
instructional expenditures. The results suggest that this widely held view is accurate:
instructional resources are underutilized and school districts facing strong competi-
tion from private schools spend more of available resources on instruction.
These results have important policy implications. Adherents of the traditional
view that “money doesn’t matter” argue that, because school districts are inefficient,
output-based incentives and an end to additional spending should be adopted. The
estimates presented here do support the conventional wisdom that school districts do
not use all available resources effectively. However, they also indicate that, ceteris
paribus, the money that is spent on instruction does “matter.” This suggests that
additional spending that is targeted for student instruction can promote educational
attainment. More generally, the existence of expense preference implies that appropriately
designed institutional reforms, which reduce managerial discretion in school districts,
could be preferred to output-based incentives that do not address the underlying source41 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
of production inefficiency. Future research that articulates the testable implications
of reform proposals and recognizes the simultaneity between school quality and the
decisions made within school districts should provide more insight into these impor-
tant questions.
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1. This view has influenced policy. For example, a 1993 statute in Texas limits administrative expen-
ditures to a fixed proportion of instructional expenditures [Lewis, 1994]. Similarly, the Chicago
School Reform Act, which was enacted in 1988, was designed to constrain non-instructional costs
[Hess, 1995].
2. Rothstein and Miles [1995] argue that this growth is overstated by the use of general price indices.
They conclude, however, that, even with an appropriate index, the growth in resources devoted to
public education has been “substantial.”
3. Because special education has drawn an increased share of instructional dollars, however, the
amount of new resources going to regular instruction may be particularly overstated by the
overall expenditure growth [Rothstein and Miles, 1995; Lankford and Wyckoff, 1995].
4. The recent literature on competition and public school quality suggests that this is an appropriate
construction [Hoxby, 1994; Dee, 1998]. An additional reason to focus on competition from private
schools as opposed to that from other public schools is that plausible instrumental variables are
more readily available.
5. The quality of this identification strategy is discussed in a subsequent section. A separate first-
stage estimation was generated for the quadratic term, (Psci)2.
6. Hawaii was excluded because it lacked within-state variation, Montana because it has no unified
districts, and Wyoming because population data on Catholics were unavailable. The remaining
school districts have a collective enrollment in excess of 33.7 million students. The focus on unified
districts is appropriate since they are the majority of districts and share similar structures and
goals.
7. The rationale for excluding these items is that it is not clear that they have a direct bearing on
achievement, that the managers of school districts have an unusual preference for such items, or
that there is much scope for discretionary spending on such items. Furthermore, unlike other
support services, the proportion of resources spent on these items has declined slightly over the
last several decades.
8. The data on the number of Catholics by county were drawn from a survey of over 200,000
congregations with total membership of nearly 115 million. See Quinn et al. [1982] for more
information on these data.
9. A priori, it is unclear how certain socioeconomic characteristics should affect the allocation of
resources. Both poor and wealthy districts might conceivably choose to spend more on non-
instructional support.
10. School districts in the most densely Catholic counties were the reference. This approach creates
four instrumental variables and overidentifies Equation (1) so that the orthogonality assumption
can be formally tested.
11. The effects associated with race and parental education might seem contradictory. However,
these results could reflect the fact that non-instructional spending is a fairly broad category that
could mean different things in different communities. In less affluent, minority communities, non-
instructional spending could involve social services and remedial support. In contrast, communi-
ties with relatively high levels of educational attainment may direct this spending towards differ-
ent programs and amenities. In this context, however, the question seems to be moot; the inclu-
sion of these covariates does not influence the key inferences.42 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
12. One source of contention over Chubb and Moe’s [1990] conclusions has been the selection and
unusual transformation of an achievement measure. See Bryk and Lee [1992] and Elmore [1991]
for extensive reviews of Chubb and Moe’s [1990] research.
13. The magnitudes of these effects are not trivial. The elasticity of the high school completion rate to
teachers per pupil is 0.26. With respect to nonteaching staff per pupil the elasticity is –0.17.
14. Anderson, Shughart, and Tollison [1991] consider the endogeneity of the pupil-teacher ratio, but
they address the question of simultaneity by employing highly implausible instrumental variables
(state per-capita income, average teacher salaries, and a dummy variable for whether a state had
reformed high school graduation requirements since 1981). In a properly specified model, these
variables should be highly correlated with achievement.
15. Brewer’s [1996] estimations also employ instrumental variables (for example, adult educational
attainment and level of owner-occupied housing), however, that have not traditionally been
omitted from models of student achievement.
16. Models of expense preference are similar to models of “x-inefficiency.” However, unlike some
models of x-inefficiency [Frantz, 1988], agents are here assumed to be fully rational. These models
are substantively different from Niskanen’s [1971] model of bureaucracy, which assumes public
agencies attempt to maximize observed output and budget size.
17. This specification facilitates a comparison with prior estimates. Furthermore, some research has
argued that the relationship between student achievement and resources is nonlinear. The results
presented here also emerge in linear and log-odds specifications. However, since Qsi = 100 percent
for several districts, any log-odds specification is necessarily ad hoc.
18. If school districts equate the marginal products of Ni and Ii, it is straightforward to show that the
following condition will hold: α  = β(Ni/Ii).
19. The 18 states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. Three hundred twenty-nine districts were deleted because
they could not be matched to the 1976-77 F33 file. The motivation for this matching is discussed in
the next section. This selection does not appear to be problematic since estimations with these data
and the full data set replicate traditional findings.
20. The basis for these challenges was that systems of education finance that made available resources
conditional on local wealth violated the “equal protection” clause of state constitutions. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in Serrano v. Priest (1971), was the first to find such a system of education
finance unconstitutional.
21. Since a Texas ruling that overturned the system of education finance was as recent as 1991,
however, Texas is not considered a “reform” state here. The second-stage results are robust to a
changed definition but the first-stage estimates are more precise when Texas is not considered a
reform state.
22. These expenditure data were drawn from the 1976-77 F33 file. The reference districts are those
that spent the most in their state in the 1976-77 school year. In the subsequent estimations, the
four indicators for the within-state expenditure ranking are included among the socioeconomic
priors, Wsi.
23. Estimates of the demand for educational spending using survey data [Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and
Shapiro, 1982] emphasize that the individual characteristics typically omitted from aggregate data
sets are significant demand determinants.
24. Furthermore, the test of overidentifying restrictions confirms that these variables can be omitted
from educational production functions.
25. Because these data are aggregated to the district-level, however, these correlations could reflect
the impact of a student’s own priors and that of his peers [Lankford and Wyckoff, 1992].
26. However, the 2SLS estimates of the effect of the resource level that used the court mandates as
instruments have to be interpreted with caution since the test of overidentifying restrictions fails
at conventional levels of significance.
27. A test of the linear restriction (α = β(Ni/Ii)) can be constructed using the chi-squared distribution
[Judge et al., 1985]. Using Model (9) and the mean levels of Ni and Ii, the test statistic is 5.84, which
exceeds the critical value at standard levels of significance. The hypothesis that school districts
allocate resources to equate the marginal products of Ni and Ii is rejected.43 EXPENSE PREFERENCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
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